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Félida, Doubled Personality, and the ‘Normal State’ in Late 
Nineteenth-Century French Psychology 
 
 
‘It must be natural’, declared Bordeaux medical professor Eugène Azam in 1876–77, ‘to think that 
perfection is exclusive to (l’apanage de) the normal state, because it has been said to me on all sides 
that I am mistaken, and that Félida’s normal state could only be the one characterised by completeness 
of memory’ (Azam, 1877a, 395).1 Azam (1822–1899) wrote to defend his choice to describe Félida 
X…, a woman with an apparently doubled personality, in terms of a ‘normal state’ and a ‘condition 
seconde’—another, second, state of being. He conceded that he differed from his principal critic of 
the time, British philosopher-psychologist George Croom Robertson, only over ‘the interpretation of a 
word’; where Croom Robertson expected a subject’s normal state to consist of ‘perfect health’, Azam 
had opted for a convenient comparative term, ‘due to the absence of a more suitable word’ (Azam, 
1877a, 396, 397). Yet, just as pre-publication suggestions from Azam’s philosophy mentor, Ernest 
Bersot, had not swayed his terminological choices (395), neither did Croom Robertson’s ‘serious 
objection’ prompt Azam to seek out a ‘more suitable word’ for Félida’s state. Rather, Azam held 
obstinately to his naming convention over the following two decades, as he updated and revised his 
observation of Félida in some twenty-four publications and communications. The ‘normal state’ and 
notions of normality thus played a part in the ‘dialogue and controversy’ surrounding Félida’s case, 
out of which, as Jacqueline Carroy has argued, ‘physicians and philosophers developed the common 
language of a physiological psychology and a psychopathology à la française’ (Carroy, 1992, 76). 
This paper takes Carroy’s claim literally, and thereby adopts a novel vantage point from 
which to explore the emergence of psychology as a scientific field of enquiry in France at the end of 
the nineteenth century. That is, I interrogate the lexical and conceptual place of the ‘normal state’ in 
debates about Félida, and trace some ways that speaking about the normal articulates with the 
epistemological and theoretical concerns of emerging scientific psychology. Fine analysis of the 
‘normal state’ can firstly help elucidate the often messy dynamics of Azam’s multiple 
communications about Félida; certain early usages of the ‘normal’ persist in Azam’s accounts as fixed 
points around which his conceptual positions otherwise appear hesitant or fluid. Beyond Azam, 
configurations of the normal are bound up with changing interpretations of apparently doubled mental 
states, and through them, with evolutions in the objects of study of psychological research. 
Reciprocally, this analysis adds a further historical context to the historically specific 
circumstances across which Peter Cryle and Elizabeth Stephens have tracked contestation and 
conceptual shifts in the normal. Their genealogy leads us to expect the normal of nascent French 
psychology to occupy an intermediate conceptual space between the undefined, comparative ‘normal 
state’ of mid-nineteenth-century physiology and the ‘normal person’ of early twentieth-century 
psychoanalysis (Cryle and Stephens, 2017, Chs. 1, 7), as researchers like Azam brought their medical 
training to bear on problems of pathological psychology, and in turn passed a cultural, theoretical and 
material legacy to Freud and others.2 Indeed, by following the work done by the normal state through 
accounts of doubled personality, I suggest an alternative lexical pathway linking these configurations 
of normality. My pathway, though necessarily brief, notably reasserts Pierre Janet’s place in early 
twentieth-century psychological thought,3 where Cryle and Stephens’s lineage passes through German 
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sexology and its American counterpart. My route also ‘doubles’ over some episodes mobilised by Ian 
Hacking (1995) for his large claims about the importance of sciences of memory in making the 
modern individual. But I tread a narrower textual path, and follow ways that speaking of the normal 
connects to psychology’s objects and methods of enquiry, and their scientific status. 
That Félida’s case was central to shaping both objects and methods of scientific psychology 
has been demonstrated by Carroy (in French-language publications),4 although it is chiefly known in 
Anglophone scholarship as an early case of double personality (Hacking, 1995, Ch. 11; Lombardo and 
Foschi, 2003; c.f. Hajek, 2020). It was one of the most prominent and most debated cases of the fin de 
siècle, running through psychological enquiry even as the preoccupations of that science shifted. Over 
the six months after it was first disseminated widely, in May 1876, Azam’s observation of Félida 
attracted responses from philosophers and physicians, elicited reports of similar cases, was abstracted 
in the French scientific and political press, and in English, was summarised, discussed, and then 
translated in full.5 It allowed proponents of a scientific psychology grounded in positive principles to 
challenge official spiritualist doctrines around the unity of the self (moi) (Carroy, 2001, 52–59; 
Hacking, 1995, 163–166). Then, as the 1880s and 1890s brought the ‘golden age’ of hypnotism, 
Azam was recuperated as a key precursor figure, as much for his observations of Félida as for his 
pioneering 1860 article on hypnotism (e.g. Dumontpallier, 1889, 24).6 Félida remained a prominent 
point of reference through to the early twentieth century, including in Pierre Janet’s developing 
notions of a mental economy (Carroy, 2001, 64–67; Janet, 1910). 
My exploration of the psychological ‘normal state’, while focusing on the intricacies of 
Azam’s writing, also follows these ramifications: first backwards and then forwards in time from 
1876. I begin by examining the ways Azam introduces the terms ‘normal state’ and ‘condition 
seconde’ in his text, and trace likely influences on his chosen terminology. His self-conscious 
terminological work centres on the second term in the pair, rather than on the unproblematically 
scientific ‘normal state’, as Azam, like his precursors, attempts to counter suspicion over the 
potentially illusory nature of extraordinary psychological phenomena. My second section teases out in 
detail the conceptual associations of ‘normal state’, as used with respect to Félida, and situates them 
amongst configurations of the normal in neighbouring disciplinary contexts. With Félida’s normal 
state an individualised state, worthy of detailed observation in its own right, we see a shift away from 
the generalised comparative normal of nineteenth-century physiology, but one that does not 
necessarily imply any prescriptive use of the normal as healthy ideal. Associations between the 
normal state and healthy activity emerge, rather, in exchanges with critics such as Croom Robertson. 
Examining Azam’s responses to such criticism in 1877–78 allows me to elucidate the reasoning 
behind the fixity of his choice to label Félida’s amnesic state as normal. Ultimately, this third section 
reveals the ways Azam must downplay the import of additional phenomena exhibited by Félida in 
order to retain his comparative, binary approach to mental states. My analysis shifts in the two final 
sections to trace state-naming conventions in a selection of other French work on double personality 
from the mid-1870s to the 1910s, for which Félida’s case constitutes a significant point of 
comparison. In asking what became of Azam’s normal state and condition seconde, I sketch a 
transition in French psychological thinking from the normal state as individualised, fixed and 
comparative, through increasing pairing of the normal and abnormal, to understandings of 
pathological characteristics as extending along a continuum bounded by the ‘normal individual’. 
Before moving on, however, it will be helpful to evoke the messy publication history of 
Azam’s observation, as a guide to the sources analysed here. Azam’s major observation of Félida 
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circulated widely in May 1876 in the pages of the Revue scientifique (Azam, 1876a), following 
presentations to the Académie des sciences morales et politiques that led to an official publication in 
the Séances et travaux de l'Académie des Sciences morales et politiques in the second half of 1877 
(Azam, 1877a). But other overlapping texts also appeared in 1876–77, including verbal 
communications to learned societies in Bordeaux and Paris (1876c), and accounts in provincial 
medical journals (1876e). Large sections are repeated verbatim between different versions as 
published (see Hajek, 2020), yet there are also variations, updates, and revisions, while circular 
references to priority mean that no version can be counted as a definitive original. That being the case, 
I take the official Academic publication of Azam’s observation as my key source, and turn 
occasionally to other versions where relevant. 
 
Labelling extraordinary phenomena 
 
When Azam came to write up his observation of Félida for publication, he was conscious both of 
stepping into a new disciplinary space, as a physician discussing ‘an observation which belongs more 
to psychology than to medicine’ (Azam, 1876a, 481), and of the lexical difficulties that might entail. 
‘The words of which I make use being ordinary words that I have been compelled to turn from their 
[usual] sense, some obscurity necessarily results’, he apologised when introducing his communication 
to the Académie des sciences morales et politiques (Azam, 1877a, 363). But if Azam acknowledged 
that he called one of Félida’s states normal ‘for want of a better word’, this was only a later response 
to Croom Robertson’s objections (Azam, 1877a, 396); Azam provided no particular clarification or 
explanation when he introduced the term in the observation proper. ‘Normal state’ appears initially as 
a routine comparative term allowing Azam to situate other significant terms present in his 
observation: the unique, and confusingly relativist, terminology employed by Félida herself. ‘She has 
always held that the state, whichever it is, in which she is at the moment of speaking to her is the 
normal state, which she calls her raison [reason], by opposition to the other state that she calls her 
crise [fit or attack]’ (Azam, 1877a, 366).7 It is Félida’s term raison that Azam signals to his readers as 
worthy of attention, not his own label for the state. ‘Normal state’ is lexically available and 
unremarkable for Azam, in the same ways as in mid-century physiological discourses (Cryle and 
Stephens, 2017, 49–59). What is more notable is that Azam transfers such routine use of the normal 
into the psychological domain, in the process assuming it to be accessible to a wider, non-medical 
audience. By the mid-1870s this was a fairly safe assumption, thanks to the scientific renown of 
Claude Bernard, whose writings on experimental method (Bernard, 1865)—grounded in his own 
physiological research—‘keenly interested many readers beyond the circle of savants’, making not 
only Bernard, but physiology itself ‘almost popular currency’ (presque populaire) (Patin, 1869). As 
Bernard and physiology entered cultivated discourse (and the Académie française), so presumably did 
the key physiological binary of the normal and the pathological. 
That the normal state was a term in routine usage contrasts markedly with Azam’s concern to 
introduce and define his appellation for Félida’s other state, ‘the second state that is conventionally 
named condition seconde’ (Azam, 1877a, 364). Although Azam presents ‘condition seconde’ as ‘a 
term borrowed from philosophy’ when relating his observation to a predominantly medical audience 
(Azam, 1876c, 12), the naming convention has sufficient significance and novelty for Azam also to 
signal it to his academic audience—composed more of philosophers than physicians,—and to gloss 
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the term sporadically throughout the remainder of the piece, principally as ‘l’état d’accès ou de 
condition seconde’ (Azam, 1877a, 374, 375, 379, 385, 391). Accès can be translated as ‘fit’ or ‘sudden 
episode’, and was in widespread medical use to designate pathological states that manifested 
suddenly, often at regular intervals, like the attacks of hysteria or epilepsy.8 A frequent synonym for 
condition seconde in Azam’s text, it helps anchor the significant term in the binary of normal state 
and condition seconde. 
Condition seconde is no neologism or arbitrary usage on Azam’s part, however, but rather a 
careful choice that places Félida’s case within a series of scientific observations of apparently 
extraordinary neuroses. In particular, Azam deliberately and scrupulously follows the lead of Belgian 
physician Évariste Warlomont in lexical choice and presentation, drawing on Warlomont’s 1875 
report on Louise Lateau, the famous Belgian stigmatic (Carroy, 2001, 55). Warlomont led a 
Commission examining Lateau’s stigmata, ecstatic periods, and prolonged fasting as part of 
prolonged debates on these phenomena at the Académie royale de médecine de Belgique.9 In the 
report, Lateau’s ‘normal state’ appears as an uninterrogated comparison-case alongside a ‘condition 
seconde’, which term Warlomont introduces self-consciously as a way to group together a range of 
altered states, including those capable of explicating Lateau’s phenomena in natural terms. He marks 
out the term by means of italics and quotation marks on its first appearance in the text, and proceeds 
to sketch its contours in a long exploration of different conditions—from brain injuries to 
hypnotism—that might produce ‘doublement de la vie’ (doubling of life) (Warlomont, 1875, 90–114). 
Persistent quotation marks and the use of pleonasm—adding ‘state of’ before condition seconde—
continue to signal this appellation as noteworthy, a new term of art which should not be taken for 
granted by his readers, in contrast to the familiarity of ‘normal state’. 
What seems to appeal to Azam is the association developed by Warlomont between condition 
seconde and natural explanations for apparently extraordinary phenomena. Indeed, it was only after 
reading Warlomont’s report on Lateau that Azam felt authorised to publish his account of Félida’s 
case, some sixteen years after first observing her condition (Azam, 1877a, 374). He was initially 
called upon to examine Félida in 1858–59, at which point she lapsed occasionally from her ‘ordinary 
state’ into a sort of ‘second life’, characterised by a pronounced change in bearing (allure) or 
personality, as well as alterations in her memory (Azam, 1877a, 364–367). But faced with widespread 
doubt from colleagues over the reality of these phenomena, Azam was dissuaded from publishing the 
case, though he did mention Félida in passing in his 1860 article on hypnotism (Azam, 1877a, 370–
371; 1860).10 Once Warlomont had discussed phenomena similar to Félida’s two lives in a 
scientifically sanctioned arena, Azam sought out Félida to supplement his 1850s observations for 
publication (Azam, 1877a, 374). He then framed Félida’s changes of bearing and memory in 
Warlomont’s terms, the already scientific stamp of condition seconde making it a ‘better word’—a 
likely replacement in Azam’s notes for earlier alternatives such as ‘second life’. 
As for the term itself, whether coined by Warlomont or not,11 condition seconde represents a 
shift from terminological binaries found in contemporaneous accounts of altered states, including 
those which Warlomont appropriated to circumscribe his conceptions of doubled life and the 
condition seconde. To illustrate what he calls the first form of doubling—which follows traumatic 
brain lesions—Warlomont reproduces an observation reported by Ernest Mesnet in 1874 and 
designates its subject as having entered a condition seconde. Mesnet himself makes no reference to a 
condition seconde, however; chiefly labelling the second state as a crise (Mesnet, 1874).12  This sits on 
several occasions in a binary pair with the ‘normal state’ and ‘normal phase’, among a number of 
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other terms (Mesnet, 1874, 106, 107, 111–112). Warlomont’s condition seconde thus replaces 
Mesnet’s crise. Now crise is also the word Félida uses to describe one of her states, a choice read by 
Jacqueline Carroy as reflecting the term’s availability in popular milieux, as a result of the cultural 
pervasiveness of discourses surrounding magnétisme animal (animal magnetism/Mesmerism). For if 
crise originally described the fit-like manifestations of Mesmer’s patients, it remained in use 
throughout the nineteenth-century in relation to the gentler, somnambulism-like states more common 
to magnetised subjects (Carroy, 2001, 46–47).13  By always glossing Félida’s crise as the more 
technical accès, Azam obscured possible links to magnétisme, and protected his observation against 
potential contamination by magnétisme’s reputation for apparently supernatural explanations and 
fraudulent phenomena. The observation of Félida thus became exactly the kind of ‘pure fact’ needed 
to combat spiritualist doctrine around the unity of the self (Carroy, 2001, 62–64).14 I contend that the 
same kind of ‘purification’ is in play in Warlomont’s and Azam’s choice of the self-consciously 
innovative condition seconde. Although the ‘normal state’ passes unmarked and uninterrogated, its 
strongly scientific connotations—associated with the eminence of Bernard’s experimental 
physiology—reinforce the legitimacy of both terms in the pair, and consequently emphasize the 
distance of double-state phenomena from the ‘regrettable (fâcheuse) promiscuity of charlatanism’ 
(Azam, 1893, 39). 
 
Félida’s normal state and ordinary life 
 
When Azam imported the scientific status of the physiological ‘normal state’ into his psychological 
observation, he also adopted the broad comparative logic that underpinned uses of the term in the 
context of mid-century physiology examined by Cryle and Stephens. Just as the physiological normal 
state stood for the unaltered state and served to set off the ‘undisturbed functions of life’ from 
pathological phenomena (Cryle and Stephens, 2017, 55), Azam uses ‘normal state’ as a basis state 
against which to examine temporally circumscribed changes in Félida’s personality and mental 
functioning: 
In the fit-like episode or condition seconde, she is more haughty (fière), more insouciant, 
more preoccupied by her appearance; moreover she is less industrious, but much more 
sensitive (sensible); it seems that in this state she gives greater affection to those who 
surround her. 
These differences with the normal state […] (Azam, 1877a, 379). 
Under this comparative logic, the two states are marked, on the one hand, as qualitatively different, 
and on the other hand, as fixed in relation to one another. That is, each term stands for a set of 
personality traits and other characteristics which persist in their broad lines between temporally 
separate occurrences; when Azam refers to Félida’s normal state, it is always more-or-less the same 
normal state, as distinct from the condition seconde.15  After Félida has experienced an episode of her 
second personality, ‘she opens her eyes to return to her ordinary existence’, to the normal state she 
left to enter into the condition seconde (Azam, 1877a, 367. My emphasis). 
It is particularly important for Azam’s study that he hold fixed the identity of the normal state 
against the condition seconde—that his terms are relational, not relativist16—because Félida’s normal 
state is not an undifferentiated basis state. Rather, it is an object of enquiry in its own right, even if 
this enquiry is always for the ultimate purpose of comparison with the condition seconde. Azam must 
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examine both states given the kinds of changes he wants to characterise: changes in personality and in 
memory. Let us begin with personality, the ‘doubling of life’ (dé/doublement de la vie) in the titles of 
Azam’s publications. As the term ‘life’ suggests, and as we see in the above quotation, what changes 
with Félida’s personality is her whole ‘manière d’être’, ‘her character and her affective sentiments’, 
and in turn, her broad patterns of behaviour (Azam, 1877a, 376, 386). By definition, Félida’s 
personality is individual, or personal, to her; the normal state is then her normal state, and is marked 
as such by possessive pronouns in the text (e.g. 370, 386). It follows that Azam must determine the 
characteristics of Félida’s normal state, or base personality, in order to identify the changes which 
occur when she enters her condition seconde. Azam indeed recognises this requirement, and 
enunciates it in his text. ‘Making the most of an occasion perhaps difficult to meet again, I study her 
with care’, he writes of an occasion in July 1875 when he encounters Félida in her normal state, which 
by that time had become highly infrequent (380). The normal state, in this particular psychological 
context, is therefore an individualised concept. If physicians like Azam, Warlomont, or Mesnet all 
invoke their subject’s normal state, the only thing these states share is a common relational logic; 
there is no sense of a qualitative generalised normality against which different subjects’ conditions 
could be examined. The physiological sense of the normal as a range of generalised healthy 
functionality appears exceedingly rarely in Azam’s texts, and only in his theoretical reflections 
(1877a, 401) and later updates (1877b, 578). 
Similarly absent from the observations is a quantitative or frequentist dimension to the normal 
state. Azam does employ ‘ordinary’ as a synonym for ‘normal’ in the initial pages of his account, and 
even contrasts Félida’s condition seconde to her ‘ordinary state’ when first introducing the former 
term (Azam, 1877a, 364). He switches to using ‘normal state’ several pages later. Ordinary, in these 
early pages, carries connotations of frequency in time, of what was ‘habitual for Félida’, not of 
tallying qualities across different subjects. It is readily interchangeable with ‘normal’, because Félida 
spent most of her time in her normal state during the late 1850s, with the condition seconde lasting 
only several hours per day (367). By 1875, however, the situation had reversed, and the condition 
seconde was now Félida’s predominant state. In order to retain his fixed comparative binary, Azam 
thus had to break the conceptual link between the normal and the ordinary: ‘today, the condition 
seconde is, so to speak, the ordinary life because it lasts three and four months in a row, against 
periods of normal life which only have a duration of three or four hours’ (391). It is a distinction he 
would maintain in subsequent writings on Félida, retaining ‘normal’ as a comparative term for one 
particular, individualised state, and using the conceptually looser ‘ordinary’ for habitual 
comportments and functioning, whether individual to Félida (as here) or common to people in general 
(as discussed below).17 
Besides being individualised, the psychological normal state is also a concept embracing the 
whole person, even her whole ‘life’. Félida’s normal state, as delineated by Azam, encompasses 
physiological functioning—‘her [sense of] taste, in the normal state, is destroyed’; character and 
bearing—‘naturally serious and sad’; sentiments—‘Félida is indifferent and shows little affection for 
those who surround her’; and memory—‘having become pregnant during her condition seconde, she 
was unaware of it [elle l’ignorait] […] during her normal state’ (Azam, 1877a, 368, 386, 381, 370).18 
Her condition seconde is, of course, similarly richly characterised. In its richness, the psychological 
normal state participates in the historical shift to a more holistic and complex concept of the normal 
that Cryle and Stephens find in fin de siècle sexology and Freudian psychoanalysis (Cryle and 
Stephens, 2017, 266–279).  
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We might then ask whether there is also a slide into a prescriptive notion of the normal state; 
in effect, does Azam mark certain personality traits or comportments of Félida’s normal state as more 
natural, or connect them to socially expected roles for lower class women? There is perhaps a slight 
normative tone when Azam mentions Félida’s industriousness in her normal state—she is a ‘good 
worker’ (Azam, 1877a, 364)—or rather her lack of it in the condition seconde, in which she is ‘less 
industrious’ and ‘more frivolous’, with Azam on one occasion associating ‘frivolity’ and ‘triviality’ 
(futilités) (379, 387, 386).19 For the very most part, however, the case reveals no clear normative 
position. Each state exhibits both positive and negative qualities; it is essentially the existence of two 
states that is problematic, such that it would count as a cure were Félida’s condition to stabilise in 
either one of them. Félida’s husband hoped she was cured when she remained in the normal state for 
many months (during the hiatus in Azam’s observations from 1859–1875), while the rarity of the 
normal state in 1876 leads Azam to propose that it would be ‘a sort of cure’ were the condition 
seconde to take over her entire life (Azam, 1877a, 377, 393).  
In neither state, moreover, does Félida’s personality fall outside of the range of ordinary 
human behaviour:  
if [in the condition seconde] she appears more attached to those who surround her, it is only 
in comparison with the way she is in the normal state, because, [and] I must insist on this, 
[nothing] we can observe in her on this point exceeds the ordinary (Azam, 1877a, 387). 
It might be tempting, therefore, to qualify both personalities as ‘normal’, but it is important to note 
that Azam does not use the term in this sense. On the contrary, he maintains a division between the 
normal—primarily an individualised comparative term—and the ordinary, with ‘ordinary’ now 
standing in for the range of habitual functioning or comportments common to people in general. 
Occupying the same ‘conceptual neighbourhood’ as this sense of ordinary are notions of completeness 
and even perfection in function—like in physiology before ‘normal’ became the dominant term (Cryle 
and Stephens, 2017, 51–55). Félida’s condition seconde constitutes ‘a complete existence, perfectly 
reasonable’ (Azam, 1877a, 385), as, by implication, does her normal state. Through both states, Félida 
carried on life seemingly like any other woman, actively hiding her condition as she undertook 
professional activities—as a seamstress and, briefly, in a grocery shop with her husband (esp. 1877b, 
577; 1878, 194). She lived a long life in the world, not confined to hospital, nor a subject of spectacle, 
unlike other similar cases (e.g. Mesnet, 1874; Warlomont, 1875). As a report in the Bordeaux médical 
puts it, ‘if chance put you in contact with her, you would not notice that she is ill, whatever her 
condition at that moment’(Azam, 1876e, 20–21). It would consequently only be guidance from Azam 
or by Félida’s husband, that an external observer ‘would be able to discern which of these two states 
is the additional state’ (Azam, 1877a, 385; also 1877b, 578; 1878, 19). If both states appear complete, 
reasonable, and unremarkable when considered against common behaviour for a woman of Félida’s 
time, what matters is that only one of them bears the label ‘normal’ in Azam’s observation. 
The normal state, in Azam’s texts, is associated with one particular characteristic, and one 
that is defined comparatively: the condition of Félida’s memory. During her condition seconde, Félida 
could remember ‘not only what has happened in previous episodes [of condition seconde], but also all 
her normal life, whereas […] during her normal life she has no memory of what has happened in her 
[condition seconde]’ (Azam, 1877a, 367). The directionality of this ‘periodical amnesia’ provides 
another reason for Azam to study the normal state in its own right; it is only in the normal state that 
Félida’s ‘alterations of memory’ can be discerned. On the advice of various philosophers interested in 
the case (notably Victor Egger), Azam accordingly attempted to circumscribe Félida’s amnesia: he 
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determined that it did not extend to ‘general ideas’, such as being able to read or write, but could 
reach no conclusion as to whether habits acquired entirely in the condition seconde would be retained 
in the normal state (368, 411–412). Although the completeness of her memory makes Félida’s 
‘second life […] by far superior to the other’ (367), Azam does not take that to mean that the 
condition seconde should properly be labelled as normal. Rather, as I have shown, he reserves the 
term normal as a comparative marker. And if it is Félida’s partial amnesia which most clearly 
characterises her normal state, the state nonetheless bears on a whole set of functions displayed by 
Félida as a particular individual, almost all of which fall within the conceptual scope of ordinary 
behaviour. As hypothesised, the psychological normal thus combines conceptual features from mid-
nineteenth-century physiology—binary comparison—with those of early twentieth century sexology 
and psychoanalysis—the normal as relating to a whole person. Yet there is a tension in Azam’s 
‘normal state’ regarding its associations with general notions of health, since Félida’s apparently 
complete and ordinary life is undergirded by an unquestionable diagnosis of hysteria, and very 
occasionally punctuated by a third, pathological state. 
  
How can a hysteric have a normal state? 
 
This returns us to Croom Robertson’s objections, with which I began this paper. Reporting on Azam’s 
observation in Mind, which he edited at the time, Croom Robertson took the opportunity to question 
Azam’s choice of ‘normal’ to describe one of Félida’s states. For him, Azam was ‘disposed rather to 
make light of the want of memory in the “normal” state’, such that ‘the state which he calls “normal” 
becomes clearly a morbid one.’ Or better, considering Félida’s pronounced physical characteristics of 
hysteria, it should be considered ‘that both states are more or less morbid’ (Croom Robertson, 1867b, 
415). As Azam recognises in his response, the binary opposition in play in such objections is between 
a functionally healthy state applicable across humankind, ‘the complete state, the state of reason’, and 
a pathological state, ‘the sickly state’ (l’état maladif) (1877a, 390).20  And Azam is prepared to admit 
that both Félida’s states are largely morbid in nature, if considered in such terms (1877a, 397). After 
all, when not using her name, he already refers to Félida as a sick person, as ‘ma malade’ or ‘notre 
malade’ (e.g. 374–378), just as he makes it eminently clear that Félida’s normal state is marked by 
pains and physical symptoms of hysteria, and that these come to invade her condition seconde in 
1876–77 (e.g. 409–10). Even Félida’s life before the onset of the doubling ‘must never have been 
perfect health’, he concedes (397). 
Where for Croom Robertson the normal and the (perfectly) healthy coincide, they do not do 
so in Azam’s observation, as we have already seen. His ‘normal state’ is entirely comparative, and the 
choice of ‘normal, for want of a better word’, falls upon the state which ‘most resembles [Félida’s] 
anterior life’ (397). The most appropriate ‘normal’, in other words, is the ultimate basis state 
preceding and perturbed by the onset of Félida’s periods of second personality. What is more, it 
encompasses a whole state of being, rather than any single function or faculty. Thus Azam is equally 
unwilling to recast his comparative binary on the basis of the (admittedly key) faculty of memory, 
unlike the editors of the Journal of Mental and Nervous Disease, for whom, from the perspective of 
‘the defect of memory, […] the “second” condition would appear to be the most nearly normal of the 
two’ (Azam, 1876d, 610–611). 
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Nonetheless, Azam does engage with his critics, and in the process—as in his observation— 
clings tenaciously to two related aspects of his terminological conception: his choice of which state to 
label as ‘normal’, and a more fundamental framing of Félida’s condition as a binary pair of states. The 
first he defends actively in updates to Félida’s case, responding to his critics on their chosen ground of 
healthiness. The second remains a matter of implicit consensus between Azam and his interlocutors; 
we can trace its influence both through Azam’s defensive work and the ways he construes Félida’s 
‘third state’. Azam’s rebuttals proceed by first re-emphasising a key element from medico-
physiological usage of the normal state: its anteriority, as a basis state against which to describe 
perturbations. In Félida’s case, the relevant perturbation is the appearance of the condition seconde, 
which leads Azam to affirm the identity of Félida’s early life and her normal state (as observed by 
him). The normal state, Azam insists, ‘is the exact representation, the continuation of Félida’s mode 
of existence up to the age of fifteen, that is of her ordinary life up to the observation of the illness’ 
(Azam, 1876b, 265).21  In other words, the very first time Félida entered the condition seconde, she 
returned afterwards to her anterior state, and not to some other state of being or mind (1877b, 579). 
Then, since Félida experienced no apparent problems of memory in her early life—it was, after all, 
the onset of the condition that prompted Azam’s intervention—it would not be ‘natural’ to locate the 
morbid processes of her amnesia in the normal state (1877b, 579). Azam’s ‘normal state’, initially 
configured as primarily comparative, is reattached in these responses to a certain sense of health, or at 
least of comparatively less morbidity than some other state. 
But which state? Azam’s first set of theoretical speculations situates Félida’s alteration of 
memory in the condition seconde. ‘Forgetting’, he stresses, ‘is not necessarily provoked by an 
incomplete or sickly intellectual state at the moment when one tries to remember’ (Azam, 1877a, 
390), as the amnesia subsequent on typhoid fever amply demonstrates (1877a, 391, 397–98; 1877b, 
579). Rather, remembering occurs in two stages: first, ‘impression’, then ‘reproduction’—it could be 
the recording stage which occurs imperfectly, with events in the condition seconde not making a 
sufficient impression on Félida’s brain (1877a, 390–391). But faced with the evident inconsistency 
between this hypothesis and his observation that Félida remembers events of one condition seconde 
during later periods of the same state, he subsequently shifts the defect of memory onto the short 
transition period between states. It would then be while transitioning back to the normal state that 
Félida would lose the capacity to reproduce impressions recorded during the preceding period of 
condition seconde (Azam, 1877b, 579–580). While, on one hand, this logic shifts the morbid burden 
away from Félida’s two states, on the other hand, it opens questions about the importance of the 
transition period and its capacity to be considered a state in its own right. 
That potential receives scant endorsement in Azam’s writing, even as he comes to realise, 
‘better than at the start of my observations’, the ‘considerable importance’ of this period (Azam, 
1877a, 411), notably in explaining Félida’s amnesias—‘the initial phenomenon that sets in motion all 
the others’ (1877b, 579). Azam repeatedly discusses the transition in descriptions of Félida’s change 
in states. ‘A spontaneous phenomenon’, its ‘principal characteristic: the loss of consciousness’, means 
it can be considered as analogous to the petit mal attack of epilepsy (1877a, 372, 411, 382; also 
1877b, 578–579). Yet, he consistently labels it a ‘period of transition’, marking it as conceptually 
distinct from, and of secondary value to the key ‘states’ manifested by Félida. This is especially 
evident compared to the way Azam refers to the analogous ‘state’ of petit mal, but switches terms to 
‘these attacks (accès)’ or ‘these periods’, when noting that both petit mal and the transition are of 
short duration (1877a, 411). Even on the one occasion where the transition is grouped among ‘all of 
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Félida’s states’, Azam soon clarifies that it is only ‘un état […] surajouté’, an auxiliary to what count 
as states proper (such as sleep, in this instance) (1877b, 578–579). The very short duration of the 
transition period—‘almost imperceptible (insaisissable)’ by the 1870s (1877a, 379, 411)—might 
account for its adjunct ontological status. Phenomena unable to be grasped during their occurrence are 
clearly distinct from the extended ‘life’ periods studied by Azam under a framework of ‘normal state’ 
and condition seconde. 
Something more is in play here, I propose, for Azam also characterizes a rare ‘third state’ of 
Félida’s as similarly ‘surajouté’ to one of the fundamental states, added on in this case to the 
condition seconde (Azam, 1877a, 413). That is, he understands Félida’s condition as fundamentally 
binary, composed of the two states which can be likened to ordinary ‘lives’, and consequently 
minimizes the import of other groupings of mental phenomena, themselves more clearly pathological. 
And this, even if Félida exhibits these phenomena frequently or their properties remain stable from 
one occurrence to the next. Thus, while the normal state and condition seconde are incontrovertibly 
personal to Félida, and often introduced by the possessive ‘her’, the third state is only ever ‘a’ third 
state, the indefinite article serving to distance it conceptually from the other two. He might class it 
unproblematically as a ‘state’ or ‘condition’, but on its first appearance in the observation, Azam is 
more concerned to categorize the third state as ancillary—‘only an epiphenomenon of the attack 
(accès)’—than to describe its key attributes (368). Strikingly, of all Félida’s states, the third is 
unambiguously pathological in nature. It is a state ‘which resembles an attack of madness (un accès 
d’aliénation mentale)’, specifies Azam, prompted by its more frequent manifestations in 1877 to 
detail it at (somewhat) greater length (413). Adding to a previously mentioned ‘unspeakable terror’ 
(368), Azam portrays a Félida prey to ‘terrifying hallucinations’ full of phantoms and blood 
(égorgements), who recognises no one other than her husband (1877a, 413; similarly 1877b, 579). In 
1877, the third state lasts up to three hours, similar in duration to the condition seconde back in 1858, 
though it returns only every few months, as against most days (1877a, 367, 413). This is no third 
‘life’, in Azam’s conception, but ‘only a sort of preface or annexe’ to the condition seconde (1877b, 
579), an ‘accessory’ or ‘epiphenomenon’ (1878, 195) to that fundamental state. His justification here 
is that Félida enters the third state from the condition seconde, and then returns to that same state once 
her terrors end (1877a, 413).22 Azam displays no uncertainty as his observation structures Félida’s 
condition around a binary logic, even as he presents himself as hesitant to ‘seek an explanation’ for 
the third state (413), or indeed much else in Félida’s case (see Hajek, 2020, 9–10). 
 
Abnormal second states 
 
In these two final sections, I trace briefly what became of Azam’s ‘normal state’, its conceptual 
associations, and the binary framework in which it was embedded. Space not permitting any 
exhaustive survey, my chain of papers follows observations of subjects claimed as comparable to 
Félida: two further cases of double personality from the mid-1870s (Dufay 1876; Bouchut 1877a, 
1877b), Jules Janet’s 1880s investigations of using hypnotism to produce ‘artificial’ doubled states 
(1888, also 1889), and Pierre Janet’s 1910 reappraisal of his brother’s ‘artificial Félida’. All these 
works look back to Félida’s case, for comparison, if not reinterpretation, such that they form a 
coherent set against which to test Carroy’s claim for the influence of Azam’s language, and from 
which to sketch the conceptual landscape of the normal in emerging French psychology.  
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As Azam’s observation of Félida became widely known, other French physicians were 
prompted to share accounts of analogous cases from their own practice. What might otherwise have 
seemed extraordinary or anomalous manifestations became authorised contributions to physiological 
psychology, ‘facts’ collected with a view to eventually elucidating pressing psycho-philosophical 
questions (Dufay, 1876, 71; Bouchut, 1877b, 414). Two physicians to (re-)frame old observations in 
explicit relation to Félida and double personality were Charles Dufay (b. 1815), a physician turned 
senator, and paediatric specialist Eugène Bouchut (1818–1891). Bouchut, writing in the Lancette 
française, thus disseminated two observations of hysteric children exhibiting ‘the appearance of a 
second life constituting the splitting (dédoublement) of life, as M. Azam would say, or if you like, 
splitting (dédoublement) of the personality’ (1877a, 282).23 
Medically trained like Azam, Bouchut and Dufay followed their Bordelais colleague in 
making routine use of ‘normal state’ as an appropriate comparative label for their subjects’ ‘first’ or 
‘ordinary’ life. They do not, however, repeat Azam’s careful naming of the altered state, neither 
reproducing the term condition seconde, nor self-consciously proposing some other term to describe 
the state. Instead, they draw on a range of already accessible labels, including the medico-psychiatric 
accès (Dufay, 1876, 69) or the more popular crise (Bouchut, 1877a, 281, 282). Alongside these 
general terms, both physicians enlist ‘somnambulism’ to designate their subjects’ second states, in a 
move which directly invokes a certain interpretative framework. It associates the second states with 
nocturnal somnambulism, in the first instance—perhaps a natural step to take in relation to patients 
who also display nocturnal episodes, though not one that is cause for any reflection on Dufay’s or 
Bouchut’s part; Bouchut simply adds the adjective ‘diurnal’ to mark the distinction between the two 
(1877a, 282, 283). But beyond its nocturnal form—starting to become known as ‘natural 
somnambulism’ around this time—somnambulism also connotes phenomena of hypnotism (or 
somnambulisme provoqué; artificial somnambulism) and its scientifically dubious cognate practice, 
magnétisme animal, whose (purportedly) clairvoyant consultants were usually known as somnambules 
(somnambulists) (see Richet, 1875, 348n, 369, 371). Connections to somnambulism are certainly 
present in Azam’s writing; somnambulism in all its varieties falls under the set of manifestations 
covered by Warlomont’s condition seconde, and Azam draws upon them as useful analogies for 
relating Félida’s case to existing psycho-physiological knowledge (esp. Azam, 1877a, 372, 384–385; 
also Hajek, 2020, 9–10). What changes with Dufay and Bouchut is the conceptual immediacy of their 
largely carefree approach to terminology. This contrasts with Warlomont’s and Azam’s careful 
terminological work, with its aim of weakening problematic links between doubled states and the 
(perceived) illusions or fraud of magnétisme. Azam’s successors appear much less exercised by the 
scientific status of their observations, perhaps precisely because Azam’s (and Warlomont’s) study had 
already validated double-state phenomena, including through its naming conventions.24 Rather, the 
reference to somnambulism makes explicit the analogies linking second states (in doubling cases) to a 
broad set of other phenomena investigated through physiological psychology.  
It additionally elicits associations with the pathological; Charles Richet straightforwardly 
glosses somnambulism as ‘this neuropathy’ in his 1875 article on hypnotism, for instance (348n1). 
Accordingly, we find occasions when both Dufay and Bouchut opt to pair ‘normal’ with 
‘pathological’ or ‘abnormal’ when comparing their subjects’ two states. Although such occasions are 
relatively rare, to evoke the abnormal or pathological alongside the normal is to shift the conceptual 
status of the normal state in these psychological observations. Another position correspondingly opens 
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up in the dispute between Azam and his Anglophone critics, as enunciated by Dufay as he makes use 
of the term abnormal: 
in [the subject RL] like in [Félida], the amnesia belongs to the normal state, to the 
physiological state—to forget a dream after waking is completely normal—and not to the 
abnormal or pathological state, since, on the contrary, during the accès, the memory is double 
(Dufay, 1876, 70). 
Where Croom Robertson questioned the choice of ‘normal state’ on the basis of that state’s 
characteristics as observed—i.e. the amnesia—Dufay flips the terms of the dispute. By glossing the 
normal state as the ‘physiological state’, he affirms its healthiness, in comparison to the other state in 
the pair, and provides justification for this view based on broadly observed phenomena. He thus 
explicitly links the two psychological states to the standard comparative pair from physiology: 
physiological/healthy vs pathological. In turn, as in Azam’s rebuttals, this tends to reorient the terms 
of the comparison, from two states particular to a given subject, towards a broader measurement 
against standards of health or morbidity. Dufay’s second use of ‘normal’ reinforces this sense, by 
referring to the commonality of forgetting dreams in the general population.  
Bouchut, too, associates the normal with generalised healthiness, when he characterises his 
second subject (a hysterical girl) as having ‘two consciousnesses and two memories, one traditional, 
normal, […] and the other exceptional/incidental (accidentelle), pathological’ (1877a, 283). In 
contrast to Dufay, however, Bouchut is more concerned to mark the second state as morbid or 
pathological, than to advocate for the relative superiority of the normal state, or the appropriateness of 
‘normal’ as a descriptor. He refers at times to the second state as ‘this morbid state’ or ‘a real sickly 
state’ (283). Without employing the word abnormal, Bouchut more consistently labels the second 
state as an unhealthy exception from the usual principles governing human physiological or 
psychological function, hence his use of ‘traditional’ as a synonym for ‘normal’, and of ‘accidentelle’ 
as linked to ‘pathological’. Accidentelle takes its philosophical sense, here, denoting some 
characteristic that does not comprise a necessary part of a subject.25 For Bouchut argues that the 
doubled consciousness of his subjects, as pathological, is also an exception to the ‘fundamental 
principles of psychology’ (281); his theoretical concern here is to protect the doctrine of the unity of 
the self. Since this, in turn, ‘forms the basis of human morality and responsibility’ (Bouchut, 1877b, 
415), Bouchut thus introduces something of a normative inflection to the normal state. Like the shift 
to conceiving the normal in general terms of health, this normativity is not consistent or dominant in 
Bouchut’s text. It is only implied, since Bouchut the physician also recognises the scientific interest of 
pathology, even if he denies its wider applicability to humanity as a whole. Similarly, Dufay in 
particular retains Azam’s interest in the individualised characteristics of his subject’s normal state as a 
whole state of being. What Dufay’s and Bouchut’s language reveals, then, is a gradual conceptual 
broadening away from a normal state defined in relation to an individual subject’s life, to a normal 
measured against healthy human functioning—one present more subtly in Azam’s defence of his 
terminological choices. If, in a sense, this is a return to ways of conceiving the normal prevalent in 
physiology, the interest directed by physiological psychology to the subject’s whole ‘life’ points 
towards more prescriptive understandings of the normal person that would emerge in twentieth-
century America (Cryle and Stephens, 2017, Ch. 7–8).  
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An ‘artificial Félida’ and the normal individual 
 
This brings me to the case history of a woman dubbed ‘an artificial Félida’, in which we find a further 
imbrication of hypnotism with observations of double personality, another twist in the dispute over 
the healthiness of the normal state, and references to the ‘normal individual’ predominating over those 
to the ‘normal state’. The subject in question, known as Marceline, was studied first by Jules Janet 
(1889) during his time at the Pitié Hospital in Paris, before being passed to the observation and 
treatment of his brother Pierre (1910). When Jules Janet encountered Marceline, she was severely ill 
with anorexia and dysphagia (difficulty swallowing), in addition to a range of other physiological 
troubles, all covered by the broad diagnosis of hysteria. With the scientific and cultural prestige of 
hypnotism then at its height, Jules hypnotised Marceline, and found that she could and would eat 
without difficulty when placed in a ‘somnambulic phase’ of hypnotism (Janet J, 1889, 473). Initially, 
Marceline spent only limited time in somnambulism, but after various complications, Janet 
discontinued his practice of ‘waking’ her, and left her to live in the second state for months at a time. 
‘All in all’, he declares in his 1889 article, ‘I have created in this woman a double existence absolutely 
analogous to that which Dr Azam’s Félida presented naturally’ (475). Jules’s tag ‘artificial Félida’ 
(475) would be echoed, albeit somewhat ironically, by Pierre in 1910, in the title of his detailed case 
history of Marceline.26  
Reading the Janets’ articles for their configuration of the normal, it is immediately striking 
that the term ‘normal state’ does not appear, apart from one reference to Félida in Pierre Janet’s paper. 
Jules Janet instead frames Marceline’s two existences in terms of various interlinked terminological 
pairs denoting states of hypnotism: ‘(hypnotic) sleep’, ‘waking’ (la veille), ‘somnambulism’, ‘waking 
state’ (1889, 474). Somnambulism, like Jules’s ‘somnambulic phase’ above, almost certainly refers to 
a (deeper) sub-state of hypnotism, along the lines of the three-state model of hypnotism developed by 
Jean-Martin Charcot at the Salpêtrière (see Binet and Féré, 1887, Ch. 6). These (sub-)states, or the 
state of hypnotism considered as a whole, were matter for detailed investigation by researchers, while 
the opposite terms in the binary, like ‘waking state’, remained unexamined and simply stood as 
qualitatively distinct. Like the ‘normal state’ of physiology, they served a comparative function, and 
demarcated the subject’s undisturbed state from the altered state induced by the manoeuvres 
characteristic of hypnotism. Indeed, in the wake of Azam’s observation of Félida, ‘normal state’ also 
had a routine presence in hypnotism discourses, whereas before 1875, the term was effectively absent 
from (the few) publications on the topic (Azam, 1860; Richet, 1875). It occupied essentially the same 
conceptual space as ‘waking state’, standing against the ‘state of hypnotism’, although these other 
terms were more prevalent (e.g. Binet and Féré, 1887). That Jules Janet does not employ ‘normal 
state’ in what is, after all, a short communication is unremarkable for the time. Nonetheless, given the 
analogy he draws between Marceline’s condition and Félida’s double existence, we can speculate as 
to whether this was a deliberate choice. Did he wish to avoid conceptual mixing between the normal 
state in its purely comparative sense, and the normal as healthy standard? 
Jules cannot, however, entirely avoid engaging with this ongoing question, albeit implicitly, 
as he worries whether leaving Marceline in her ‘second personality’ (i.e. somnambulism) for long 
periods would entail any ‘serious disadvantage (inconvénient)’. Concluding that it would not, he 
nonetheless labels the state as ‘this abnormal personality’ (1889, 475). This echoes the use of 
‘abnormal’ or ‘pathological’ by Dufay and Bouchut, and accords with widespread understanding of 
hypnotism as an experimental neurosis. It also constitutes the first instance of a personality being 
16	
	
qualified as ‘abnormal’ in this chain of cases. But as in previous cases, Marceline’s ‘abnormal 
personality’ displays apparently superior health to her waking state—after all, the fact that she could 
eat and generally live more fully is why Jules left her in somnambulism for months at a time. Thus 
when Pierre writes Marceline’s case in 1910, he reopens the terminological debate and advocates for a 
different understanding of the normal state: 
It is absurd to call a state of depression incompatible with life state 1 or natural state; it is 
implausible that this young woman has always been in such a state from the beginning of her 
life (1910, 525. My emphasis).27 
With this argument, Pierre Janet associates notions of both anteriority and general health with the 
normal state; for the moment, we can consider his ‘natural state’ as occupying approximately the 
same conceptual space as Azam’s ‘normal state’. What Janet does, in effect, is to reprise Azam’s view 
of the normal state as anterior—which itself follows from the comparative usage of normal state in 
physiology, as the unperturbed state. But he locates that anteriority further back in time, before 
puberty, equated here with the onset of hysteria. Before puberty, Marceline ‘had at her disposition all 
her sensory functions (sensibilités) and all her functions: that is the true state 1. The state in which we 
found her at the Pitié Hospital is an abnormal state brought about by hysteria’ (525. My emphasis). By 
redefining the first state as that existing before Marceline developed hysteria, Janet superimposes a 
sense of healthy functioning onto the anterior ‘normal state’. We could say that he addresses both 
Azam’s and Croom Robertson’s concerns. The implication is of a flaw in Azam’s observation, in that 
he did not take into account sufficiently early periods of Félida’s life when delineating her normal 
state (526).28  Of course, there would be no reason for Azam or Janet to observe their subjects until the 
commencement of hysterical symptoms, which makes observing the ‘true state 1’ rather hypothetical. 
Pierre Janet continues his redefinition of Félida’s two states by inverting the sense of the 
condition seconde, or what Jules called ‘somnambulism’. The condition seconde, proposes Pierre, is 
effectively a return of the (putatively) healthy state of childhood, after those abnormal perturbations 
seen in the initial observation state (Azam’s normal state). Under this logic, the numbering of the 
states by Azam is the wrong way around, such that when Félida’s life is almost entirely filled by the 
condition seconde, it simply constitutes a return to ‘the normal state of her childhood’ (526). As for 
Marceline, when hypnotised:  
she regains normal functioning, the sensibility and memory that she had previously; I see no 
reason to distinguish this state from the natural state of her childhood (525–526). 
This reference to Marceline’s previous psychological qualities (sensibility and memory) inflects 
Janet’s usage of ‘natural state’ towards an individualised conception, albeit one that must be 
compatible with habitual forms of healthy functioning. Normal and natural, although conceptually 
very close, are nonetheless held apart in Janet’s text; both mark an anterior state against which to 
examine physio-psychological perturbations, but normal (and abnormal) are reserved for comparison 
against the general form of health,29 while natural denotes characteristics particular to a given subject. 
Having firmly reattached the normal to its connotations of health, Pierre Janet is well placed 
to compare Marceline’s functions to some putative general standard. In turn, that he writes more often 
of the normal individual than of the normal state means his version of the normal becomes holistic, as 
well as normative. A holistic sense of the normal—as relating to an individual’s whole life—was, of 
course, already present in Félida’s case. But where Félida’s normal state is the object of careful 
investigation in Azam’s observation, Janet gives only sporadic attention to the characteristics of the 
‘normal individual’ in his 1910 article, and always with regard to an explicit comparison. He does so 
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in two distinct ways. First, when describing experiments performed to test Marceline’s respiration and 
(skin) evaporation rates, Janet’s comparison has a quantitative basis. It is a matter of measuring the 
ratio of oxygen to carbon dioxide exhaled by three members of Charles Richet’s physiology 
laboratory, taking the average, and reporting it alongside the number obtained for Marceline, with the 
reader left to count the difference between them (1910, 355–356). If configuring the normal as 
quantitative average might seem a surprising conceptual and methodological departure in personality 
psychology, it would better be understood as a borrowing from medical forms of counting (Cryle and 
Stephens, 2017, Ch. 2), inspired by Janet’s own medical training,30 and especially by Richet’s 
physiological expertise.  
Moreover, counting is not a method that Janet applies to psychological properties. His second 
form of comparison proceeds by qualitative extrapolation along a posited continuum of functioning. 
In this way, the observed doubling of mental states in hysterics speaks to the psychological makeup of 
‘normal individuals’: 
When there are large oscillations of mental level in hysterics, the two mental states separate 
from one another […]. They cease attaching together by gradations and memories, as in 
normal individuals. (1910, 528)  
To conceive normal (or healthy) phenomena and their pathological counterparts as differing only in 
degree, not in kind, was a structuring principle of physiological research, and a framework shared by 
Janet, and indeed most French scientific psychologists, under the heading of pathological psychology. 
But if Azam’s observations also presuppose that studying departures from the healthy can elucidate 
psychological functioning in general, Pierre Janet is able to establish a direct parallel between 
hysterics and the ‘normal individual’, thanks to another shift in the way he interprets Marceline’s two 
states. For he abolishes the binary logic held so tenaciously by Azam, and instead construes 
Marceline’s actual mental state at any one time as extending along a continuum, characterized by 
gradations in the presence of key symptoms or functions: 
The two states […] were only two extremes: Marceline was rarely entirely in one or entirely 
in the other, most often she was in intermediate states of depression or ascension. (511) 
What matters for understanding Marceline’s condition thus becomes her degree of depression (e.g. 
497) and fatigue (513)—or alternatively her level of alertness (494)—and treatment reduces to  
‘removing the symptoms (les accidents) without expressing an opinion on [her] overall state’ (339). In 
turn, problematic psychological functioning becomes defined by particular symptoms, not a change in 
an individual’s entire personality. It is easy to see how an apparently ordinary person might be 
susceptible to a such a pathology. This projected ‘normal person’ finally occupies, in many ways, the 
conceptual space that Cryle and Stephens analyse as constituting a ‘convergence of the average and 
the healthy, of scientific quantification and medical examination’ in conceptions of the normal (2017, 
290). 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is not so much our point of arrival, in Pierre Janet’s theoretical and therapeutic approach to 
hysteria,31 that matters here, as my contention that we can trace part of its development to contestation 
around the normal in French psychological discourses. Leading back from Janet’s ‘normal individual’ 
is a lexical and conceptual pathway that winds through observations of double personality from a 
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comparative ‘normal state’, itself borrowed from physiology by Eugène Azam in writing his case 
history of Félida. It adds a rich strand to the genealogy of normality so carefully explored by Cryle 
and Stephens (2017). Concomitantly, my analysis reaffirms the centrality of phenomena of doubling 
(dédoublement), and of Félida’s case in particular, as a conceptually productive in the early years of 
French psychological enquiry. 
Two interlinked choices structure Azam’s account of Félida, and ramify through subsequent 
observations and discussions. First and most fundamentally, certainly least controversially, he framed 
the phenomena manifested by Félida under a binary logic of double personality or double states of 
consciousness. Each of the two states is characterised in rich detail, in accordance with Azam’s 
epistemic and textual approach to the observation—a meticulous, iterative study of one unusual 
woman’s life. His second choice was a seemingly routine matter of borrowing the comparative term 
‘normal state’ from physiology. ‘Normal state’ bore a scientific stamp that could be taken for granted, 
unlike its opposing term, where work was needed to mark extraordinary psychological phenomena as 
properly scientific objects of study. But if the choice of term was straightforward, the place occupied 
by the normal state in Azam’s writing is conceptually complex, and was quickly critiqued by others in 
his field. 
At issue was the extent to which a broad sense of health should be attached to the normal 
state, or alternatively whether it should be apprehended as purely relational, individual to a particular 
subject. When faced with the fact that Félida’s habitual state was no longer the one he had termed 
normal, and with questions over her evident pathology, Azam prioritised terminological stability. His 
commitment to an individualised, holistic normal, as one of a binary of states, remained firm. Around 
this conceptual core, he reconfigured relations between the normal and the ordinary, resituated the 
location of Félida’s defect of memory, and reiterated the ancillary nature of psychological states that 
would otherwise gain in status through his shifting explanations. Beyond any role as instigator of 
scientific psychological language, Azam’s work on Félida is thus most significant in showing the 
ways a researcher can adapt the concept of the normal state in response to the epistemic exigencies of 
a highly individualised object of study. 
On one hand, his text helped engender a lexical shift, making the normal state readily 
available for use in relation to other psychological phenomena such as hypnotism. The term similarly 
found a place in subsequent studies of double personality. But on the other hand, the conceptual 
associations of Azam’s customized ‘normal state’ were increasingly subject to slippage, as researchers 
opted to strengthen links between the normal and general bio-psychological health. In observations by 
Dufay and Bouchut, this conceptual shift is effected by a change in the opposite term in the binary 
pair of mental states; they pair normal with its lexical inverse abnormal, glossed as pathological. 
Indeed, Azam’s condition seconde seems to have been particularly unattractive to later writers; having 
helped legitimise phenomena of double personality, it disappeared almost immediately from 
psychological debates. What persists in the psychological normal is a certain tension between the 
general and the particular; Dufay, for one, continued Azam’s practice of delineating his subject’s 
‘normal state’ in terms of her individual physiological and psychological characteristics.  
The normal can no longer hold together these two usages in the case of Marceline, studied 
first by Jules Janet, who dubbed her an ‘artificial Félida’, and later by his brother Pierre. What would 
be termed Marceline’s ‘normal state’ under Azam’s scheme is so clearly ‘incompatible with life’, that 
Pierre Janet is prompted to flip the order of the state naming. In essence, he moves the unperturbed 
comparative state (Azam’s normal state) back in time, to a (hypothetical) moment when Marceline 
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experienced good health. The state in which she is habitually observed then becomes an abnormal 
perturbation, while her second personality is construed as a return to the original state of normal 
function. Janet opts for ‘natural state’ over ‘normal state’ to allow for some individual variation 
within an implied range of health. His normal finally denotes the generalized, but still holistic case: 
the ‘normal individual’. Perhaps more importantly for the evolution both of Janet’s therapeutic work 
and of psychology’s objects of study, he also dismantles Azam’s obstinately asserted binary logic. 
What counts in Janet’s new conception is the degree of some symptom exhibited by a psychological 
subject at a given moment—her depth of depression, or degree of anaesthesia—not the way symptoms 
might combine into a discrete complex, that one might designate a ‘state’.  
To return ultimately to the question of Azam’s language, we find that once again where the 
normal is involved, it is contestation that proves generative. Azam’s language does not so much 
constitute a model for later French psychological science, as its complex conceptual associations, 
grounded in the particularities of Félida’s case, provide rich matter for adaptation to the changing 
preoccupations of psychological science. 
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Notes 
	
1 Translations are my own, except otherwise noted. 
2 On lineages connecting 1870s French psychology to the work of Freud and Janet, see 
Carroy (1991, esp. 219–313), Ellenberger (1970), Mayer (2013). 
3 See Brown (2003). 
4 Carroy’s careful examinations have focused on the case’s importance in the broad psycho-
philosophical context and on the doubled (or even multiple) nature of its authorship (1991, 
103–109; 1992; 1996; 2001). 
5 E.g. Janet Paul, 1876; Bouchut, 1877b; Dufay, 1876; Azam 1876d; Meunier, 1876; Croom 
Robertson, 1876a, 1876b. 
6 On the ‘golden age’ of hypnotism, see (among many others): Carroy, 1991; Ellenberger, 
1970; Harrington, 1988; Mayer, 2013; Plas, 2000. 
7 Emphasis in original. Carroy (1992, 75) and Hacking (1995, 167) have remarked on the 
confusion engendered by the way Azam reuses Félida’s terminology in his text. 
8 Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 7th ed. (1878), s.v. ‘accès.’ 
9 The Commission was charged with evaluating Nestor Charbonnier’s article on Lateau 
(Warlomont, 1875, 6), but its investigations expanded to encompass the phenomena 
displayed by the stigmatic and very lengthy theoretical reflections accounting for those 
phenomena. On Lateau and the Belgian Academy, see Lachapelle (2004). 
10 Indeed it was while attempting to treat Félida that Azam first essayed the Braid’s then-new 
method of hypnotism and thereby came to introduce it, and the neologism, into France. 
11 It is possible that Warlomont appropriated the ‘condition seconde’ from Huxley’s 
comments on Mesnet’s case (Warlomont, 1875, 94). 
12 This is not an exclusive choice, with additional terms including accès (106, 111), ‘the 
pathological phase’ (106, 107), and ‘the state of illness (maladie)’ (107). 
13 On magnetic and hypnotic cultures, see Carroy (1991, esp. 35–64). 
14 On discursive influences of magnétisme on other psychological topics, and self-conscious 
efforts to sever them, see Harrington (1988), Plas (2000), Hajek (2017). 
15 Azam observes a gradual transformation in the nature of each state, as we learn in his 
updates to the case, e.g. (1877b, 577–581). 
16 Conversely, Félida’s view of the two states is purely relativist. That is what makes it 
confusing (Carroy, 1992, 77). 
17 Hence Azam could use ‘normal’ and ‘ordinary’ together in one update, in order to convey 
that Félida’s anterior life is a fixed state set against the condition seconde, as well as habitual 
16	
	
	
to Félida, and broadly healthy. Though further on, even he confuses the senses somewhat 
(1877b, 579). 
18 Carroy notes a fascination with Félida’s pregnancies amongst both Azam and later 
commentators, which she associates with a ‘magnetic [cultural] imaginary’ (2001, 62). 
19 This statement reads: ‘Dans sa condition seconde elle est gaie, frivole et plus préoccupée 
de sa toilette et de mille futilités.’ (Azam, 1877a, 386) 
20 Strikingly, ‘l’état maladif’ appears as the ‘abnormal state’ in the English translation of 
Azam’s observation (1876d, 606, 608). This may reflect the often poor quality of the 
translation, but may also indicate a wider use of abnormal in Anglophone contexts at this 
time. Another gratuitous ‘abnormal’ appears on p. 588. 
21 Also Azam, 1877a, 386; 1878, 195. 
22 But note some inconsistencies in similar descriptions from later updates (1877b, 579; 1878, 
195). 
23 Bouchut’s observations were subsequently presented to the Académie des sciences morales 
et politiques, appearing in the proceedings as a kind of response to Azam’s study (1877b). 
Dufay’s observation (1876), which dates from the 1840s, concerns a young woman called 
RL, who displays markedly greater intelligence and visual acuity during her accès. 
24 Reciprocally, Dufay’s and Bouchut’s observations provided further scientific validation for 
Azam’s by demonstrating that Félida’s case was not isolated in science. 
25 Dictionnaire de l’Académie française, 7th ed. (1878), s.v. ‘accidentel/elle.’ 
26 Pierre Janet’s argument incites the reader to choose between considering Marceline as an 
artificial Félida, or Félida’s condition itself as in many ways artificial. Marceline’s case had a 
significant influence on his conception of dissociation (Carroy, 2001, 64–67; see also Carroy 
and Plas, 2000). 
27 Brown (2003) mentions this reconfiguration without interrogating the connotations of 
‘normal’.  
28 This also reveals a shift in Janet’s own deployment of the term ‘normal state’, from an 
earlier usage which overlapped with Azam’s (e.g. Janet P, 1889, 114, 114n1). 
29 The exception is the reference to Félida’s normal state, which is no doubt for ease of 
comparison with Azam’s descriptions.  
30 See Carroy and Plas (2000). 
31	Discussed briefly by Brown (2003, 286).	
